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THE INCOMPLETE RECORD IN NEW
YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL
ASSOCIATION V. CITY OF NEW YORK
Eric J. Mogilnicki *
Alexander Schultz **
ABSTRACT
A Second Amendment case now pending at the Supreme Court, New York State
Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, tests the extent to which New York City may
limit the movement of guns along city streets. The briefing in that case is, however,
incomplete. Second Amendment jurisprudence calls for an examination of
historical analogues to the firearms regulation at issue. Here, the New York State
Rifle and Pistol Association asserted that there are none. This Article identifies
numerous historical analogues to the City’s transportation restrictions, most of
which were not identified in the briefing before the Court.
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court heard oral argument in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n
v. City of New York on December 2, 2019. The case tests the extent to which New
York City may limit the movement of guns along city streets.
As the oral argument indicates, if the Supreme Court reaches the merits of the
Second Amendment challenge, 1 the Court will look at whether there are
* Partner, Covington & Burling, LLP.
** Associate, Covington & Burling, LLP. The authors are grateful to Beth Brinkmann and
Michael Gaffney for critical insights and constructive comments throughout the drafting process,
and to MaKade Claypool, Claire O’Rourke, and Jon Ostrowsky for excellent research assistance.
1. New York argued that the case is moot because the City has repealed the relevant provisions
of law and the state has enacted a law preventing localities from enacting similar regulations. See
Suggestion of Mootness at 1, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York (NYSRPA), No. 18280 (U.S. July 22, 2019), 2019 WL 3451573, at *1. Five Democratic Senators filed an amicus brief
arguing that the matter is moot and that public confidence in the Court would be eroded if the Court
reached the merits. See Brief of Senators Sheldon Whitehouse et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 1–3, NYSRPA, No. 18-280 (U.S. Aug. 12, 2019), 2019 WL 3814388, at *1–3. The
New York State Rifle & Pistol Association (NYSRPA) responded that the case is not moot because
the City acted to “frustrate this Court’s review” and because a change in the law is not equivalent to
an injunction prohibiting enforcement of any future transportation ban. See Response to
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historical antecedents to the firearms transportation regulation at issue.2 Justice
Kavanaugh has written that “history and tradition show that a variety of gun
regulations have coexisted with the Second Amendment right and are consistent
with that right.” 3 Similarly, in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court
said that “longstanding” firearms regulations—those with a significant historical
pedigree—are “presumptively lawful” and generally fall beyond the scope of the
Second Amendment. 4 As examples of regulations with a strong historical
pedigree, the Heller Court mentioned prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons
and restrictions on the possession of firearms by felons. 5
Before the Court, the New York State Rifle and Pistol Association (NYSRPA)
strenuously denied that any “history and tradition” support New York City’s
firearms transportation restrictions. NYSRPA asserted in its briefing that “there
is no historical analog to the City’s [regulatory] regime” and that “while a few
jurisdictions required a license to use designated ranges for target practice at the
founding, none appears to have had restrictions on transporting a firearm either
outside city limits for target practice or within the city for other purposes.” 6
NYSRPA repeated its same “no historical analog” assertion at oral argument 7—
and so did the Office of the Solicitor General, participating in the argument as
amicus curiae. 8
In response, New York City identified a robust tradition of “regulating the
possession and use of firearms,” including historical restrictions on the discharge of
firearms in public areas. 9 The City also noted various restrictions on the “storage
and transport of gunpowder.” 10 But the City did not provide a full accounting of
the extent to which jurisdictions have historically restricted the transportation of
firearms. 11
Respondents’ Suggestion of Mootness at 1, NYSRPA, No. 18-280 (U.S. Aug. 1, 2019), 2019 WL
3545853, at *1. The U.S. Solicitor General, weighing in at the Court’s request, disagreed with
NYSRPA’s mootness arguments but contended that a live controversy still exists because NYSRPA
could amend its complaint and seek damages. See Letter from Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor Gen., Office
of the Solicitor Gen., to Scott S. Harris, Clerk, Supreme Court of the U.S. (Nov. 15, 2019),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18280/122653/20191115171839625_Letter%2018-280%20%20views.pdf [https://perma.cc/YCN9DWZG].
2. Transcript of Oral Argument at 57, NYSRPA, No. 18-280 (U.S. Dec. 2, 2019), 2019 WL
6467836, at *57 (Justice Alito question about historical record); id. at 60 (Justice Breyer question
about historical record).
3. Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting).
4. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 & n.26 (2008).
5. See id. at 626–28.
6. Brief for Petitioners at 27–28, NYSRPA, No. 18-280 (U.S. May 7, 2019), 2019 WL 2068598,
at *27–28 (citation omitted).
7. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 2, at 19.
8. Id. at 33.
9. Brief of Respondents at 4, NYSRPA, No. 18-280 (U.S. Aug. 5, 2019), 2019 WL 3713689, at
*4 (emphasis added) (quoting Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2012)); see
id. at 20–23, 41 n.35.
10. Id. at 4, 34 n.28.
11. Cf. id. at 28 (“Petitioners object that the City has not identified an exact historical analogue
for its law. But . . . Heller does not require such a direct line from historical precedent.” (citations
omitted)). The City also pointed to laws in effect in 1986 as well as a handful of other twentieth-
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This Article demonstrates the surprising degree to which the historical record
undermines the assertions of NYSRPA and the Office of the Solicitor General.
As Part I demonstrates, there is a robust tradition within the United States of
restricting the transportation of firearms. Throughout the nineteenth century,
numerous jurisdictions placed stringent limits on firearms transportation, and
others, like New York City, permitted firearms transportation for some purposes
but restricted it for others. Part II discusses New York City’s firearms
transportation restrictions in more detail and demonstrates that they are in step
with this long-standing tradition.
I. NUMEROUS JURISDICTIONS HAVE HISTORICALLY RESTRICTED
THE TRANSPORTATION OF FIREARMS
Numerous enactments disprove NYSRPA’s assertions that “there is no
historical analog to the City’s regime” and that no jurisdiction “appears to have
had restrictions on transporting a firearm . . . within the city.” 12 In truth, states
and cities alike have protected public safety by preventing or limiting firearms
transportation. Many of these restrictions were enacted shortly after the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, which is particularly notable for those
interested in Americans’ understanding of the Second Amendment at or near the
time it began to apply to the states.13
These historical transportation restrictions may have been overlooked because
most used the verb “carry” rather than “transport.” But as the Supreme Court
itself has explained, the very “origin of the word ‘carries’” makes it clear that
“‘carry’ includes conveyance in a vehicle”; thus, “one may . . . ‘carry a weapon’ tied
to the saddle of a horse or placed in a bag in a car.” 14 The language and structure
of the statutes and ordinances collected below indicate that the provisions used
“carry” in precisely this sense—to include carrying in a vehicle as well as about
one’s person. Indeed, jurisdictions with more limited goals would expressly
restrict only the carrying of firearms “on or about one’s person.” 15
century restrictions, but not the historical materials identified in this Article. See id. at 34–35 &
nn.29–30.
12. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 27–28.
13. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 87 n.18 (2013) (“‘[T]he focus of
the original-meaning inquiry [should be] carried forward’ to the Reconstruction era” as “it was the
Fourteenth Amendment that made the Second applicable against states and cities.” (quoting Ezell v.
City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702 (7th Cir. 2011))); Eric M. Ruben & Saul Cornell, Firearm
Regionalism and Public Carry: Placing Southern Antebellum Case Law in Context, 125 YALE L.J. F. 121,
123 n.11, 134 (2015) (analyzing enactments during “the era of the Fourteenth Amendment” in
alignment with scholars who view Americans’ “understanding of the Second Amendment at the time
of adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment” as a key interpretive issue).
14. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 128, 130 (1998) (first citing BARNHART
DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 146 (1988) (tracing the word from Latin “carum,” which means
“cart”); then citing 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 919 (2d ed. 1989) (tracing the word from Old
French “carier” and the late Latin “carricare,” which meant to convey in a cart or other wheeled
vehicle); and then citing OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY 148 (C.T. Onions ed.,
1966) (same as Oxford English Dictionary)).
15. See, e.g., Deadly Weapons Act of 1869, ch. 32, § 1, 1869 N.M. Laws 312, 312 (declaring it
“unlawful for any person to carry deadly weapons, either concealed or otherwise, on or about their
persons within any of the settlements of this Territory” (emphasis added)); see also Brief of Respondents
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As an initial example, the State of Texas began restricting the transportation of
firearms in 1871, generally forbidding “any person in this state [from] carrying on
or about his person, saddle, or in his saddle bags, any pistol.” 16 In addition to paying
a fine, violators had to “forfeit . . . the weapon or weapons” so carried.17 To soften
this general prohibition, Texas made exceptions for “the carrying of arms on one’s
own premises or place of business,” for “persons traveling,” and for those with a
“reasonable ground for fearing an unlawful attack upon his person . . . so
imminent and threatening as not to admit the arrest of the party about to make
such attack.” 18 The “traveling” exception was largely intended for persons
journeying into or leaving Texas jurisdictions, not merely transporting firearms
within a jurisdiction. 19
Four Texas cities soon followed the state in enacting their own transportation
restrictions. In 1887, Dallas barred “any person in the City of Dallas [from]
carry[ing] on or about his person, saddle, or in his saddle bags, any pistol,” excepting
only persons permitted by the 1871 state law to carry weapons. 20 Austin passed
an identical ordinance in 1880, 21 as did San Antonio 22 and McKinney 23 in 1889.
Nashville, Tennessee, crafted its own regulatory regime in 1873, generally
Andrew Lipson & William G. Gross at 18–26, Gould v. Lipson, No. 18-1272 (U.S. May 6, 2019),
2019 WL 2068011, at *18–26 (collecting additional examples).
16. An Act to Regulate the Keeping and Bearing of Deadly Weapons, 12th Leg., R.S., ch. 34, §
1, 1871 Tex. Gen. Laws 25, 25 (emphasis added). Most historical transportation bans used the verb
“carry,” raising the question of whether they reached the transportation of guns. However, that
question was resolved by the Supreme Court in Muscarello v. United States, which, relying on the
etymology of the word “carries,” concluded that the plain meaning of the word embraces
transportation in a car, cart, or other wheeled vehicle. See sources cited supra note 14 and
accompanying text.
17. § 1, 1871 Tex. Gen. Laws at 25. Later amendments also proscribed carrying a firearm in a
“portfolio or purse.” See Christian v. State, 686 S.W.2d 930, 933 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc).
For the purposes of the statute, it made no “difference whether the pistol . . . was loaded or
unloaded”; “[t]he law merely sa[id] that it is unlawful to carry a pistol.” Steele v. State, 166 S.W. 511,
511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1914); see also English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 473 (1871) (affirming defendant’s
conviction after he carried defunct pistol with the intent to “have it mended” prior to “go[ing] to a
neighboring county”).
18. § 2, 1871 Tex. Gen. Laws at 25. Additional exceptions—e.g., for law enforcement officers—
were either explicit or implicit in the Texas statute and other statutes (and are not detailed here).
19. See, e.g., George v. State, 234 S.W. 87, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1921) (“We do not believe one
going with a crowd on an excursion and coming back the same day . . . could buckle on a pistol and
hide himself from prosecution by claiming he was a traveler.”); Irvin v. State, 100 S.W. 779, 780 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1907) (explaining that journeying between Roby, Texas, and Hamlin, Texas, would be a
defense, but “if [the defendant] went about some business or pursuit disconnected with his journey,
he would cease to be a traveler”). Texas courts thus recognized that a broader reading of “traveling”
would render the general prohibition on “carrying” a nullity. See Bain v. State, 44 S.W. 518, 518
(Tex. Crim. App. 1898) (“If the liberal definition is given to the word ‘traveler,’ almost every person
who goes from one place to another may be considered a traveler”; “[w]e do not understand . . . that
it was the object of the lawmakers to place this liberal construction on the statute by the use of this
term.”). The canons of interpretation militate against reading such an “exception [to] swallow” the
general rule. Warger v. Shauers, 574 U.S. 40, 52 (2014); see also Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 11
(1977) (same).
20. Dall., Tex., An Ordinance Prohibiting and Punishing the Unlawful Carrying of Arms, §§
1–2 (July 18, 1887) (emphasis added).
21. Austin, Tex., An Ordinance Prohibiting the Unlawful Carrying of Arms, §§ 1–2 (May 4,
1880).
22. SAN ANTONIO, TEX., REV. CRIM ORDINANCES ch. 10, §§ 1–2 (1889).
23. MCKINNEY, TEX., REV. CODE OF ORDINANCES no. 20 (1899).
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prohibiting persons from “carrying a pistol . . . or other deadly weapon” within
the city.24 But the Nashville ordinance clarified “that the provisions of th[e] act
relating to carrying such deadly weapons . . . [do not] extend to the act of handling
or moving such deadly weapons in any ordinary business way.” 25 The structure of
this ordinance—namely, the exception for those “moving” weapons “in any
ordinary business way”—demonstrates that the Nashville City Council thought
“carrying” a weapon embraced moving or transporting it.
Shelby County, Tennessee, followed Nashville’s lead in 1881. An existing
Shelby ordinance already prohibited “carry[ing] concealed on or about the person
any pistol . . . or other deadly weapon.” 26 Then, on May 5, 1881, the following
prohibition was added: “Or to carry any pistol . . . or any other deadly weapon of
like character at all or in any manner.” 27 For this new and unqualified
transportation prohibition, Shelby County carved out exceptions for those
carrying weapons “in self-defense or while executing some law.” 28
Arizona municipalities similarly restricted the intra-jurisdictional
transportation of firearms during the nineteenth century. In 1873, Tucson made
it unlawful for any person to “wear or carry any . . . gun, pistol, . . . or other
dangerous or deadly weapon . . . within the inhabited portions of the corporate
limits of the Village of Tucson.” 29 And given the locution “wear or carry,” 30 the
Tucson ban evidently proscribed transportation in a saddle, wagon, or other
vehicle—not just wearing a gun on one’s hip. 31
The most famous (or infamous) of these enactments was an 1881 Tombstone,
Arizona ordinance that made it “unlawful to carry in the hand or upon the person,
or otherwise, any deadly weapon within the limits of [the] city of Tombstone,
without first obtaining a permit in writing for such purpose (and upon good cause
shown by affidavit).” 32 The Tombstone ordinance—which was the jurisdiction’s
response to frequent outbursts of gun violence—required anyone arriving in
Tombstone to immediately check a firearm at their “primary destination,”
typically a hotel or a stable. 33 Once checked, a gun could be retrieved and carried
away only “while leaving town.” 34 On October 16, 1881, Tombstone Police Chief
24. NASHVILLE, TENN., ORDINANCES ch. 108, § 1 (1881).
25. Id. § 5.
26. MEMPHIS, SHELBY COUNTY, TENN., ORDINANCES ch. XII, art. II, § 364-9 (1898) (emphasis
added).
27. Id. (emphasis added).
28. Id.
29. Tucson, Ariz., Ordinance no. 9, § 1 (Jan. 28, 1873).
30. Id. (emphasis added).
31. See, e.g., Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (“[A] statute should be construed
so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or
insignificant . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101
(2004))).
32. JEFF GUINN, THE LAST GUNFIGHT: THE REAL STORY OF THE SHOOTOUT AT THE O.K.
CORRAL—AND HOW IT CHANGED THE AMERICAN WEST 162 (2011) (emphasis added) (excerpting
Tombstone, Ariz., Ordinance no. 9 (Apr. 19, 1881)).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 162–63; see id. at 198 (explaining that two cowboys later involved in the Shootout at
the O.K. Corral, Tom McLaury and Ike Clanton, “took a wagon into Tombstone” while “armed with
pistols and Winchester rifles” and, at least initially, “obeyed Town Ordinance Number Nine by
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Virgil Earp and Doc Holliday enforced this ordinance against the cowboys Frank
McLaury, Billy Claiborne, and Ike and Billy Clanton. When the officials noticed
the cowboys’ horses “had rifles hanging from their saddles,” it precipitated the
confrontation now known as the Shootout at the O.K. Corral. 35
In the wake of that shootout, the Territory of Arizona enacted its own
prohibition on firearms transportation. The legislature made it unlawful for “any
person within any settlement, town, village or city within this Territory [to] carry
on or about his person, saddle, or in his saddlebags, any pistol,” and violators had to
both pay a fine and “forfeit . . . the weapon or weapons so carried.” 36 Exceptions
were made for “the carrying of arms on one’s own premises or place of business,”
for “persons traveling,” and for “one who has reasonable ground for fearing an
unlawful attack . . . so imminent and threatening as not to admit of the arrest” of
the would-be assailant. 37 Arizona, much like Tombstone, still “permitted
[travelers] to carry arms within settlements or towns” for a short amount of time—
the statute allotted “one-half hour” “after arriving . . . and while going out” of a
given jurisdiction. 38 Outside of those time limits, however, persons in Arizona
had “to divest themselves of their weapons.” 39
Los Angeles, California, crafted its own transportation regime in 1878,
decreeing that “no persons . . . shall wear or carry any . . . pistol . . . or other
dangerous or deadly weapon, concealed or otherwise, within the corporate limits
of [the] city.” 40 As in Arizona, all such firearms had to instead be “deposit[ed] . . .
in a place of safety.” 41 Exceptions were made for “persons actually traveling, and
immediately passing through Los Angeles” and for “stranger[s]” who had entered
the jurisdiction “wearing or carrying weapons” but who had yet to receive
“warning of this ordinance.” 42
In 1881, the State of Arkansas also made it illegal to “wear or carry in any
manner whatever . . . any pistol of any kind.” 43 Consistent with this broad
prohibition, the Supreme Court of Arkansas would later uphold convictions on
multiple occasions for those “carrying” firearms in a vehicle. 44 Outside of the
checking their guns, either [by leaving them at the stable] or the hotel”).
35. Id. at 226.
36. An Act Defining and Punishing Certain Offenses Against the Public Peace, § 1, 1889 Ariz.
Sess. Laws 30, 30 (emphasis added).
37. Id. § 2.
38. Id. § 6, 1889 Ariz. Sess. Laws at 31.
39. Id. § 7.
40. L.A., CAL., ORDINANCES AND RESOLUTIONS no. 36 (1878) (emphasis added).
41. Id.
42. Id. A decade later, Los Angeles explored a new ordinance that would have given the Board
of Police Commissioners authority to grant armed carriage permits. See The Election of Various Officers
Deferred: The Salary of Chief of Police and Mounted Officers Raised—Good Citizens Will Soon Be Permitted to
Carry Concealed Weapons, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1887, at 2.
43. Act of Apr. 1, 1881, ch. XLV, § 1907, 1884 Ark. Acts 490, 490; see also Lemmons v. State,
20 S.W. 404, 405 n.1 (Ark. 1892).
44. See Rowland v. State, 499 S.W.2d 623, 623–24 (Ark. 1973) (affirming defendant’s
conviction for carrying a pistol after he “was arrested . . . for a traffic violation[,] [and] [i]n his truck
the officers found two shotguns . . . and a loaded .38 caliber pistol”; it mattered not that “[a] chain
was wrapped around the shotguns, passed through the trigger guard of the pistol, and secured with a
padlock”); see also Stephens v. City of Fort Smith, 300 S.W.2d 14, 15 (Ark. 1957) (affirming
conviction where defendant “carried the pistol in the glove compartment of his car” and noting:
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general ban, statutory exceptions existed for persons “upon a journey or upon his
own premises” 45 or for those carrying “any such pistol as is used in the army or
navy of the United States” so long as such pistols were carried “uncovered and in
[one’s] hand.” 46
Kansas jurisdictions enacted similar transportation restrictions during the
1880s. In 1881, the State of Kansas instructed city councils to “prohibit and
punish the carrying of firearms, or other dangerous or deadly weapons, concealed
or otherwise.” 47 Ordinances by various Kansas municipalities followed. For
example, Galena, Kansas, decreed that same year that no person “shall carry a
pistol . . . or other deadly weapon within the limits of this city.” 48 Similarly, in
1887, the City of Lakin, Kansas, banned travelers from “com[ing] inside” the city
with a weapon in their possession without permission from the marshal. 49 Lakin
also forbade individuals within city limits from having “in [their] possession or
about [their] premises any gun, pistol or weapon of any kind” without “a permit
to carry or keep said gun,” minor exceptions aside (e.g., for law enforcement
officers or firearms salesmen). 50 Any “gun, pistol or other weapon found in the
city limits contrary to . . . th[e] ordinance” would be confiscated.51
II. NEW YORK’S REGIME MIRRORS THESE HISTORICAL
TRANSPORTATION RESTRICTIONS
The State of New York currently prohibits the transportation of firearms as
part of a statute banning firearm “possession.” 52 State law and city regulations

while some state statutes only prohibit carrying “on or about [one’s] person,” (quoting KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 435.230 (repealed 1974)), “[Arkansas’s] statute prohibits carrying a pistol in any manner
whatever” (internal quotation marks omitted in second quotation)).
45. § 1907, 1884 Ark. Acts at 490.
46. § 1908, 1884 Ark. Acts at 490; see also, e.g., Haile v. State, 38 Ark. 564, 564–65 (1882)
(upholding defendant’s conviction for “carry[ing] uncovered . . . but not uncovered and in his hand,
. . . [an] army pistol”). The army-pistol exception was intended to accommodate what the Supreme
Court of Arkansas conceived of as the “constitutional right to keep and bear arms for the[] common
defense.” Id. at 565–66 (emphasis added); see id. at 566 (“The Legislature, by the law in question, has
sought to steer between” (1) “afford[ing] citizens the means of prosecuting . . . their private broils . .
. [by] inflict[ing] death upon his fellow-citizens, upon the occasion of any real or imaginary wrong”;
and (2) “an infringement of [the citizenry’s] constitutional rights” which prevent “governments [from]
disarming the subjects, so as to render them powerless against oppression.”).
47. An Act to Incorporate and Regulate Cities of the First Class, and to Repeal All Prior Acts
Relating Thereto, ch. 18, art. 3, § 23, 1881 Kan. Sess. Laws 146, 146. This statutory “shall” was
changed to “may” in 1901, at which point the statute simply “authorized a city council to prohibit and
punish the carrying of firearms . . . within the city.” State v. Bolin, 436 P.2d 978, 979 (Kan. 1968)
(emphasis added); see also City of Salina v. Blaksley, 83 P. 619, 620 (Kan. 1905).
48. Galena, Kan., Ordinance no. 2, § 6 (June 27, 1881). The Galena ordinance was an
expansion of an 1877 enactment which only prohibited carrying “any concealed pistol” within city
limits. See Galena, Kan., Ordinance no. 3, § 6 (July 6, 1877).
49. Lakin, Kan., Ordinance no. 10: An Ordinance Relating to Guns, Pistols, and Other
Weapons, § 1 (June 8, 1887).
50. Id. § 2.
51. Id. § 3.
52. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.01(1) (McKinney 2019) (proscribing “possess[ing] any firearm”);
People v. Carney, 795 N.Y.S.2d 10, 11 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (holding that defendant unlawfully
“possessed” firearms “by transporting the weapons” in a vehicle).
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then interact to create a number of exceptions to this general prohibition. 53
The State of New York has established two primary types of handgun licenses:
a “premises” license (which permits firearms possession in a home) and a “carry”
license (which more broadly allows firearms transportation outside the home). 54
Consistent with state law, New York City’s rules generally prohibit a “premises”
licensee from removing a firearm from his or her residence and transporting it
throughout the city.55 This prohibition applies regardless of whether a gun is on
or about the premises-licensee’s person or in a locked trunk in his or her vehicle.56
Within New York City, there are various exceptions to the state’s general
transportation prohibition. One exception broadly permits firearms
transportation by persons with a state-issued “carry” license who also request and
obtain a special permit from the city’s police commissioner. 57 Additional
exceptions allow those with state-issued “premises” licenses to transport their
firearms to: (1) an authorized small arms range or shooting club, or (2) a
designated hunting area. 58 And, as of July 21, 2019, the city also permits premises
licensees to transport their firearms to and from any “residence, or place of
business, of the licensee where the licensee is authorized to possess such
handgun.” 59 Similarly, by virtue of a state law that took effect on July 16, 2019,
the city must permit premises licensees to transport their weapons from any
location where they may lawfully possess firearms to “any other location where
[they are] lawfully authorized to have and possess” them.60
This kind of regime—a general ban on firearms possession and transportation
coupled with carefully drawn exceptions—is firmly within the United States’
“history and tradition.” 61 Part I described fourteen jurisdictions that had
established a general ban on firearms transportation more than a century ago.
Many of these bans, like New York City’s today, had carefully drawn exceptions.62
For example, Tombstone, Arizona, and Lakin, Kansas, both had exceptions akin
to those found in New York law, which allowed firearms transportation with the
permission of law enforcement officials. And many other jurisdictions—Los
Angeles, California; the States of Arkansas and Texas; numerous cities within
Texas; and the Territory of Arizona—carved out analogous exceptions for hunters
or for those traveling or journeying to other jurisdictions where they could
lawfully possess firearms.
The assertions made by NYSRPA and the Office of the Solicitor General before

53. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.20; N.Y.C., N.Y, RULES OF THE CITY OF N.Y. tit. 38, § 5-23(a)
(2019) (amended 2019).
54. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(2)(a), (f).
55. N.Y.C., N.Y., RULES OF THE CITY OF N.Y. tit. 38, § 5-23(a)(1).
56. See id. § 5-23(a).
57. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(6).
58. N.Y.C., N.Y., RULES OF THE CITY OF N.Y. tit. 38, § 5-23(a)(3)–(4).
59. Suggestion of Mootness, supra note 1, at app. 8a–9a (excerpting updated version of N.Y.C.,
N.Y., RULES OF THE CITY OF N.Y. tit. 38, § 5-23(a)(3)(i)).
60. Id. at app. 14a (excerpting recent amendment to N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(6)).
61. See Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting).
62. See supra Part I.
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the Supreme Court that there is “no historical analog” to New York City’s
firearms rules are mistaken. The restrictions on the movement of firearms within
city limits find ample precedent in historical state and city efforts to regulate
weapons transportation. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to identify all
such precedents, the foregoing examples demonstrate that the historical record
presented in the briefing by NYSRPA and the City of New York is significantly
incomplete.

